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Newsletter#l 73 A call to resist illegitimate authority 
The Philippine 
Opposition Movement 
ERIK GUYOT 
0 ver the past year, the Philippines 
has joined the ranks of countries where 
an entrenched dictatorship is rapidly 
being challenged by a broad-based op-
position movement. After 13 years of 
almost virtual one man rule, the Philip-
pine political arena is being swept by 
new winds of change. In the cities, tens 
of thousands of demonstrators regular-
ly overflow the streets to be dispersed 
only by water cannon and gunfire. In 
the countryside, a strong guerilla move-
ment has called certain areas "off 
limits'' to the Philippine military. 
Officials both in Manila and Wash-
ington see the days of the Marcos gov-
ernment as numbered - some say at 
the outside 18 months. The question 
has become not who among the promi-
nent political personalities in the Phil-
ippines will supplant Marcos, but what 
form of economic and political system 
will replace the current regime. There is 
a growing sense - of hope in the 
Philippines, apprehension in Washing-
ton - that a post-Marcos government 
will be broad-based, nationalist in pro-
gram, democratic in action, and com-
mitted to genuine land reform. 
Thirteen Years of One Man Rule 
The Marcos government's rule since 
1965 set in motion the social forces 
which are now enacted in the urban 
demonstrations and rural resistance. 
Before the Marcos era, Philippine 
politics was generally characterized by 
the maneuvering for power among a 
relatively small group of elite politi-
cians. Family and personai ties formed 
the basis for power alignments while 
the inability of any one faction to con-
solidate power for long was reflected in 
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a string of one term Presidents. Politics 
was often an avenue for building pri-
vate largesse. Senate President Jose 
Avelino candidly summed up the un-
written rules of the period thus: "If you 
cannot permit abuses you must at least 
tolerate them. What are we in power 
for? We are not hypocrites. Why 
Continued on page Two 
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should we pretend we are saints when in 
reality we are not?" 
The Marcos era changed that system 
of alternating rule by various factions 
of the pro-U .S. elite. Soon after his 
election in 1965, Marcos began to in-
stitutionalize the role of a new actor in 
politics which would guarantee his con-
tinued position: the military. Through 
the expansion and integration of the 
military into ''economic development'' 
Marcos was ultimately able to trans-
form the military into a power base 
which only he controlled. 
In the early 1970s a growing na-
tionalist movement demanding eco-
nomic sovereignty and the removal of 
U.S. military bases began to make its 
presence felt both in the courts and in 
the streets. Marcos responded swiftly to 
this challenge by declaring Martial Law 
on September 21, 1972. The Philippine 
Congress was abolished, the press was 
muzzled, and within a few weeks over 
30,000 people were jailed. Speaking at a 
rally in front of the White House on the 
twelfth anniversary of Martial Law, 
former Senator Jose Diokno firmly laid 
responsibility at the U.S. doorstep: 
''Faced with a resurgent nationalism 
which demanded that all foreign bases 
be removed, the U.S. government, 
Marcos, and the elite decided that be-
fore the organized strength of the peo-
ple equalled the strength of their rhetor-
ic, Martial Law was necessary.'' 
By declaring Martial Law Marcos ef-
fectively positioned himself as sole 
guarantor of the U.S. military bases, 
thereby insuring his position vis a vis 
the U.S. while consolidating his power 
over the domestic opposition. During 
the early years of Martial Law, Marcos 
transformed the military into an effec-
tive power base expanding it fourfold 
from a modest size of 60,000 to over 
240,000 personnel. Direct U.S. military 
aid was crucial to this process jumping 
from $10 million for the twenty year 
period prior to Martial Law to $170 
million for the first five years of Mar-
tial Law. Moreover, with U.S. advice 
and training, an extensive national 
security system was firmly established. 
U.S. advisors applying their experience 
from Saigon helped set up the secret in-
telligence agency NISA as well as the 
crowd control unit METROCOM. 1 
This consolidation of power through 
the military rather than the traditional 
parliamentary methods brought about 
two conditions. First, since Marcos had 
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effectively dismantled the business and 
upperclass' major power base in the 
National Assembly, their future ability 
to mount sustained opposition was 
severely limited. Second, the massive 
crackdown and establishment of the 
military as a major political force con-
vinced many of the student, peasant 
and worker leaders that parlimentary 
maneuverings alone could not dislodge 
the Marcos regime. 
This deepening immis-
eration has given the Phil-
ip pines the distinction of 
having the second lowest 
daily food consumption rate 
in Asia, lower than Bangla-
desh. It also created a social 
powderkeg waiting to 
explode. 
The imposition of Martial Law and 
the subsequent militarization were the 
logical outcome of the model of eco-
nomic development practiced in the 
Philippines. Export-oriented growth 
and ''development from above'' be-
came the overriding policy. Under the 
guidance of the IMF and its sister insti-
tution the World Bank, the Philippine 
economy was geared even more 
towards exporting a few agricultural 
products such as coconut, pineapple, 
sugar, and banana as well as the pro-
duction of light goods by foreign 
multinationals. To attract multina-
tionals, low wages, "labor discipline," 
and currency devaluation were neces-
sary. In addition, the entire Philippine 
economy was bound even tighter to the 
fluctuations of the world commodities 
market. 2 
Along with this form of economic 
development, Marcos introduced the 
present system of concentrating eco-
nomic wealth in the hands of a few loy-
alists, which presently carries the epi-
thet "crony capitalism." Under crony 
capitalism, Marcos expropriated com-
mercial holdings from certain busines-
ses and transferred them to personal 
friends and the military. The coconut 
industry, which one out of every four 
Filipinos depends upon and is the 
largest foreign exchange earner, is the 
prime example. The industry was ex-
panded and brought under the control 
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of a complex web of coconut mills, 
credit associations exclusively for large 
plantations, and export boards. At the 
bottom of the pyramid, the vast majori-
ty of day laborers or tenants receive 
from one-third to one-fourth of their 
crop worth approximately $200 per 
year. Perched on top are Defense Min-
ister Juan Ponce Enrile and the 
"coconut king" Eduardo Cojuangco. 
In the sugar industry, controlled by 
sugar baron Roberto Benidicto, the top 
7% of the landlords own 46% of the 
land, while over half of the landowners 
are relegated to 9% of the land. The ex-
pansion of these vast plantations con-
tinues to be carried out at the expense 
of small landowners who are displaced 
through debt mortgaging or military 
means; Peaceful attempts by farmers to 
organize and retain their land are 
systematically cut short by the Philip-
pine military. 
In the cities, the government has 
created export processing zones where 
it guarantees low wages and no strikes 
for foreign multinationals. The "suc-
cess'' of this policy is reflected in the 
declining wage rates: from 1972 to 1978 
wages for skilled workers dropped 
25 CT/o, unskilled 30%. This deepening 
immiseration has given the Philippines 
the distinction of having the second 
lowest daily food consumption rate in 
Asia, lower than Bangladesh. It also 
created a social powderkeg waiting to 
explode. 
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With the international recession in 
1979, the model of development from 
above began to come apart at the 
seams. Foreign markets for Philippine 
exports shrunk. The first world erected 
protectionist barriers against Philip-
pine products throwing more employ-
ees out of work. And the massive 
foreign borrowing needed to lubricate 
the system began to ratchet the Philip-
pine foreign debt up to precarious new 
levels. One tremor and the house of 
cards was likely to collapse. 
The Opposition 
The assassination of Senator 
Benigno Aquino on August 21, 1983 
triggered off capital flight of massive 
proportions. In the months following 
the assassination hard currency fled as 
the Philippine financial elite apprehen-
sively watched the growing demonstra-
tions. This near abandonment of Mar-
cos by Philippine business prompted 
U.S. Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to 
later chide that the staggering Philip-
pine foreign debt of $25 billion could be 
slashed if Philippine investors recalled 
the $10 billion they had salted away 
overseas. 
For many in the Philippine middle 
and business classes, the assassination 
marked the most significant in a long 
series of · political killings by the 
military, stripping away whatever 
legitimacy the Marcos regime may have 
had. For the first time, many in the 
middle class took to the streets in pro-
test with some two million people join-
ing Aquino's funeral procession. Since 
the Fall protests, a myriad of old and 
new organizations have composed the 
opposition. Ranging from traditional, 
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elite-oriented politicians intent primari-
ly on replacing Marcos, to issued ori-
ented organizations calling for exten-
sive economic and social change, the 
opposition falls into three broad 
categories. 
The so-called traditional opposition 
is comprised primarily of older politi-
cians from the Martial Law and pre-
Martial Law era. Most prominent 
among them are Salvador Laurel, a 
former Senator in Marcos' ruling party 
and Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw of the 
liberal party. Due to their pro-U.S. 
stance and acceptance of the U.S. mili-
tary bases, the State Department has 
been assiduously cultivating this group 
as a replacement for Marcos. Under the 
banner of the UNIDO coalition, the 
elite opposition seeks "national recon-
ciliation" or powersharing with Mar-
cos in some form. Their economic 
policies are basically similar to the cur-
rent Marcos austerity measures and 
reflect their powerbase among big 
business. 
The second major grouping is com-
prised of traditional politicians with a 
strong commitment to national. sover-
eignty and social reforms. Prominent 
among the liberal democrats are former 
Senator and noted human rights ac-
tivist Jose Diokno and Agapito "Butz" 
Aquino, younger brother of Benigno 
Aquino. Drawing their support 
primarily from professional and the ur-
ban middle classes, they refuse power 
sharing with Marcos and call for the 
removal of all U.S. military bases. 
In contrast, the popular opposition is 
comprised less of political personalities 
and more of mass based, issue oriented 
organizations. Alexander Padilla, 
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General Secretary of the Nationalist 
Alliance, a broad coalition which spans 
the liberal democrats and the left, 
described the cooperation between the 
two thus, " ... all the people's 
organizations, clandestine or open, are 
all in the process of dismantling the dic-
tatorship and they are learning to coop-
erate with each other, work with each 
other, and support each other." 
The major organization on the left is 
the National Democratic Front (NDF), 
an illegal, broad-based coaltion encom-
passing most sectors of Philippine 
society: workers, peasants, women, na-
tional minorities, clergy, students, and 
professionals. Drawing its strength 
from these sectors supporting it, the 
NDF is recognized as the best-organ-
ized and most potent opposition force 
in the Philippines. Its twelve point pro-
In the first quarter of 
1984, some 950,000 work-
ers were laid off due to the 
debt crisis. Unemployment 
has now reached 40% while 
inflation has climbed 
past 65%. 
gram, which reflects both the specific 
interests of the various sectors and their 
common unity, calls for the dismant-
ling of the Marcos dictatorship and 
U.S. control, and reestablishment of 
democratic rights, genuine land re-
form, and self-determination for na-
tional minorities. 
Two important members of the NDF 
are the Communist Party of the Philip-
pines (CPP), founded in 1968, and its 
armed wing, the New People's Army 
(NP A). The CPP and the NP A, along 
with the Christians for National 
Liberation and the Kabataang Maka-
bayan (Patriotic Youth), founded the 
NDF after all legal opposition was 
banned during Martial Law. 
The wide appeal of the NDF and the 
NP A are illustrated by two of their 
more well known members. Horatio 
Morales, jailed in 1982 as chairman of 
the NDF, was one of the rising stars of 
Philippine public administration. On 
the night of December 26, 1977 the 
former student leader was to be award-
ed the Jaycees outstanding young man 
Continued on page Four 
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of the year. But instead he announced 
that since "All our well-meaning ef-
forts were in vain ... I decided to join 
the NDF. '' Father Conrado Balweg, 
the most wanted man in the Northern 
island of Luzon, comes from the Ting-
guian tribal minority and is the highest 
known ranking NP A commander. He 
joined the NPA when his work to pre-
vent the confiscation of ancestral lands 
by a large logging corporation brought 
the military after him. 
Due to Marcos 'decree mak-
ing power over the National 
Assembly, the strength of 
the opposition lies not with 
the elite opposition in the 
National Assembly, but 
with the ''Parliament of 
the streets'' led by issue-
oriented organizations. 
Move to the left 
The collapse of the economic system 
constructed during Martial Law is 
polarizing Philippine society and 
pushing the opposition further left. In 
the first quarter of 1984, some 950,000 
workers were laid off due to the debt 
crisis. Unemployment has now reached 
400/o while inflation has climbed past 
650/o. According to the IMF's own cal-
culations, due to its austerity program 
and devaluation of the peso, the econ-
omy will contract by 5-60/o in 1985. 
What this means in real terms is that the 
middle and working classes will be hit 
again with skyrocketing prices for basic 
commodities while hundreds of thous-
ands more lose their jobs. 
Workers have not taken the IMF's 
bitter medicine without protest. Last 
year over 268 strikes were staged pro-
testing fixed wages and rising prices. 
Despite the ban on strikes in ''vital in-
dustries," Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU-
May First Movement), a militant trade 
union of over 350,000 members, pre-
dicts more strikes for 1985. Last 
month, transport workers, the Nation-
alist Alliance and student groups led a 
four day general strike in Davao which 
totally paralyzed the Philippines' sec-
ond largest city and gave a prelude of 
future actions. 
In the political arena, the two main 
news events of 1984, the May elections 
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and the Aquino assassination inquiry, 
have taken a back seat. Half a year 
after the elections, the 59 opposition 
assemblymen realize that Marcos is 
not about to engage in powersharing 
with them. And through a brilliant legal 
maneuver, Marcos defused the assassi-
nation issue, at least for a while. After 
the majority of the Agrava commission 
implicated Chief of Staff General Fa-
bian Ver and 24 officers in the 
assassination, the case was forwarded 
to a special court for possible prosecu-
tion. By placing any future prosecution 
in the hands of the Sandiganbayan, a 
low level court used during Martial Law 
against political opponents, Marcos 
can delay the proceedings and insure 
greater protection for his generals. 
Due to Marcos' decree making power 
over the National Assembly, the 
strength of the opposition lies not with 
the elite opposition in the National 
Assembly, but with the ''Parliament of 
the streets'' led by issue-oriented 
organizations. After years of careful 
organizing work, the opposition can 
regularly call out 10,000 disciplined 
demonstrators. One example was the 
simultaneous December 1 protests at 
the U.S. Embassy in Manila and Clark 
airfield. Led by KMU and student 
groups, 10,000 protestors at the Em-
bassy and 5,000 at the military base 
demanded the end of "U.S. interven-
tion in Philippine affairs" and the 
removal of all U.S. military facilities in 
the Philippines. 
Among the traditional opposition, 
the parliment of the streets is now 
recognized as the center of politics. 
Recently, Cardinal Jaime Sin, head of 
the Catholic Church and an advocate of 
"national reconciliation," urged par-
ishoners to join the street demonstra-
tions, a move that was seen as an at-
tempt to ''regain the initiative'' from 
the NDF. Populist assemblyman Ho-
mobono Adaza is hopeful that through 
"the convergence of the parliamentary 
opposition with the opposition of the 
street ... Marcos can be toppled before 
1987." 
Moreover, many of the demands in-
troduced by the left have also been 
adopted by the elite nationalist opposi-
tion. In late December leading political 
personalities signed a "Declaration of 
Unity" committing a future Presiden-
tial candidate to draw up a new con-
stitution. legalize the CPP, grant 
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amnesty for all political prisoners, and 
remove the U.S. military bases. Signifi-
cantly members of the pro-U .S. opposi-
tion, Eva Estrada Kalaw and Salvadore 
Laurel, refused to sign. Even the very 
language of the NDF has been incor-
porated by no less than Defense 
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Speaking 
on the military situation, he warned 
that the NP A could reach military pari-
ty in two years, or a "strategic stale-
mate'' - a term not coined by the Pen-
tagon. 
The fundamental basis of the Philip-
pine opposition is in the countryside 
where the vast majority of the people 
live and where human rights abuses 
have been the most widespread. By all 
acounts, arrest, torture, and extralegal 
executions by the military have been on 
the rise. And according to Amnesty In-
ternational, the torture of political de-
tainees is considered ''standard operat-
ing procedure.'' Certain branches of 
the Philippine military are especially 
noted for their propensity towards 
violence against the Philippine Con-
stabulary which numbers over 40,000 
and the Integrated Civilian Home 
Defense Force, a paramilitary force of 
65,000 composed primarily of local 
toughs. 
With guerilla fronts in 
over 50 of the Philippines' 
73 provinces, NP A strength 
has increased so that it now 
controls approximately 20% 
of all villages. 
The operations of the Philippine 
military have led to the coining of 
several new terms. "Salvaging" refers 
to the execution and disfigurement of 
unarmed civilians. In "censusing" the 
names of the inhabitants of a house-
hold are painted on the home. If on a 
given day those whose names are listed 
are not present, they are considered 
''subversives.'' Strategic hamletting 
and free fire zones, designed to deny 
the NPA popular support, have in 
many cases increased resentment 
against the military. 
Not all experts agree, however, with 
this terminology. When questioned in a 
rare interview on "salvaging" Ver 
responded "What salvaging? I don't 
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know what it means. In the NISA [Na-
tional Intelligence Security Authority] 
we use another term - TND - ter-
mination and disposal.'' 
As Pentagon officials readily con-
cede, the increase in military atrocities, 
combined with economic injustice, has 
contributed to the growing popular ap-
peal of the NP A. From a few numbers 
on 1968, the NPA has grown to an esti-
mated 10,000 armed guerrillas, another 
10,000 irregulars, with 200,000 active 
supporters. With guerrilla fronts in 
over 50 of the Philippines' 73 pro-
vinces, NP A strength has increased so 
that it now controls approximately 
200Jo of all villages. Moreover, accord-
ing to Pentagon officials, the NP A has 
"no apparent external support" and its 
indigenous nature ''is one of the most 
troublesome aspects of the 
insurgency.'' 
The NP A, however, is not only a 
fighting force. According to news ac-
counts, above all it is also a political 
organization providing services in guer-
rilla zones. Many NP A members serve 
as health care workers, social workers, 
agronomists, veterinarians and educat-
ors. In these areas rents from absentee 
landlords have been suspended and in 
some areas land reform has begun. 
During the initial stages of the NP A's 
growth in the early and mid 1970s, it 
was this extensive program of organiz-
ing training, and service in the rural 
areas which laid the foundation for the 
NPA's present expansion. While the 
NP A was still vulnerable militarily, the 
Muslim separatist Moro National Lib-
eration played a crucial role in pinning 
down 850Jo of the Philippine military in 
the southern island of Mindanao. Cur-
rently, the MNLF and the NP A are 
believed to cooperate occasionally on a 
tactical level. 
Presently, Davao city in Mindanao is 
viewed by the Philippine military and 
the NP A as something of a ''test-case'' 
for future operations by both sides. The 
Fifty-foot Marcos monument outside of Baguio City north of Manila. 
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countryside surrounding Davao is re-
garded as a region of especially strong 
NPA support. The city itself is the first 
area where the NP A has begun urban 
operations. 
Last July the Philippine military 
launched a large series of military 
sweeps around Davao, driving hun-
dreds of families out of their homes to 
declare large areas "no man's land." 
Recently, a new elite counterinsurgency 
battalion, which had been training for 
over a year, began operations in the 
region. The U.S. has stepped up its role 
too; speeding the delivery of some 56 
VI50 armored vehicles, most of them 
destined for Mindanao. Yet, so far, the 
increase in material and the new coun-
terinsurgency program do not seem to 
have had much of an effect. 
According to reports in the Philip-
pine press, the NP A plans to move out 
of the present ''strategic defense'' to 
Continued on page Seven 
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CIA Cultivates Academia 
on Philippines 
As the Philippine crisis has inten-
sified, the CIA and other branches of 
the executive have turned to academia 
for advice on the insurgent New Peo-
ple's Army (NP A). Often under the 
guise of legitimate scholarship, the CIA 
is increasingly taking advantage of the 
independence and credibility of certain 
Philippine academicians. 
David Rosenberg, Associate Pro-
fessor of Political Science at Mid-
dlebury College has rapidly becpme one 
such expert. Over the last two years he 
engaged in extensive consulting for the 
government and CIA as well as testify-
ing before Congress on how best to 
def eat the insurgency. Most recently, 
while giving a lecture at Washington's 
Asia Society, he described the NP A as 
receiving aid from ''left-wing groups, 
socialist groups, radical groups in 
Western Europe and the U.S. that do 
provide publication outlets as well as 
some material contributions." Only a 
few years ago Professor Rosenberg was 
loosely associated with some Philippine 
opposition groups in the U.S. 
Over the years, Professor Rosenberg 
developed close ties with some mem-
bers of the U .S.-based opposition to the 
Marcos government as well as Ameri-
cans critical of that government. The 
editor of Marcos and Martial Law, 
Rosenberg was seen by many as a liber-
al critic who on occasion sponsored 
talks by Filipino oppositionists. He 
often received information and litera-
ture from Philippine opposition groups 
that, while not sensitive, was provided 
in good faith. 
In 1983, however, while on sab-
batical at Johns Hopkins School for 
Advanced International Studies, Ros-
enberg began consulting for various 
governmental agencies on the Philip-
pine insurgency. Among them were: the 
World Bank; the State Department; the 
CIA; and International Government 
Business Counselors Inc., a private risk 
analysis firm with strong CIA connec-
tions through its senior partner William 
Colby. The main focus of this consult-
ing was on the effect of economic aus-
terity programs on rural instability. 
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In May of that year, Rosenberg par-
ticipated in a conference at Langley 
which brought together academicians 
on the Philippines with high-level of-
ficials from the State Department, Na-
tional Security Agency, Congressional 
Research Service, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, and the CIA. The conference 
at CIA headquarters was closed to the 
public and dealt with ''The Rural 
Economy and Insurgencies in the 
Philippines.'' 
Aside from Professor Rosenberg, 
other Philippine specialists attending 
were Justin Green of Villanova Univer-
sity and the noted historian David Joel 
Stienberg, Vice President of Brandeis 
University. As Rosenberg later told one 
observer, the CIA had invited him and 
other academicians since they ''wanted 
somebody from the outside ... who has 
more of an analytical or historical 
framework who can try and make sense 
of all these pieces [of data] they had." 
When Rosenberg subsequently ac-
knowledged the extent of his consulting 
work, acquaintances associated with 
the U .S.-based Philippine opposition 
were widely surprised. But according to 
longstanding Friends of the Filipino 
People member, Boone Schirmer, in 
the Spring of 1984 Rosenberg later 
"repented that he had done wrong" to 
consult for the CIA. Rosenberg ex-
plained that he wanted to see how the 
CIA worked from the inside. Among 
Filipino and American circles, this 
avowed recognition of the morally 
dubious character of working for the 
CIA was generally accepted as the last 
word. 
But later, Rosenberg would state that 
"under certain circumstances" he 
would consult for the CIA again. He 
maintained that ''it is important to 
separate intelligence activities from 
covert operations, some people don't 
think it is possible, it may only be a 
hope. And if that is the case we need to 
make sure we, the academic profession, 
have as wide open a debate as possible 
as to what is going on in the Philip-
pines, not only to serve the interests of 
U.S. foreign policy but to hold our-
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selves accountable to it.'' As for some 
fell ow academicians who refused to 
work for the CIA on professional or 
moral grounds, Rosenberg claimed, "it 
only isolates us from whatever respon-
sible influence we may have ... you can 
speak truth to power." 
Although Rosenberg may have disa-
greed in private with the powers that be 
in the defense and intelligence com-
munities, in Congresional testimony 
last September, he argued that for the 
U.S. "intervention is inescapable" and 
for the Philippine military ''more civic 
actions are necessary." To defeat the 
insurgency a package of massive 
economic aid tied to political and 
economic reforms was not sufficient, 
he argued, a large training program to 
"reprofessionalize" the Philippine 
military was also required. 
Schirmer expressed the general sense 
of betrayal among Philippine activists 
that '' A man can make a mistake and 
realizing it is a mistake can therefore be 
accepted. But to go back and repeat the 
same things shows a certain degree of 
insincerity.'' 
In last month's lecture at the Asia 
Society, which was meant to ''bridge 
the gap between theory and practice,'' 
Rosenberg spelled out more of his 
"agenda" for the Philippines. Regard-
ing human rights abuses and the mili-
tary's role in the assassination of Sena-
tor Aquino, Rosenberg called for a 
speedy trial, not so much for justice per 
se, but because it "is a very essential 
part of any counterinsurgency program 
to remove some of the most important 
problems with the government which 
seem to exacerbate radical reactions." 
In addition, he recommended ''more 
and more training, especially via !MET 
[training in the U.S.], which historical-
ly has proved to be a very effective pro-
gram." 
Rosenberg's allegations at the lecture 
about "left-wing groups" providing 
material aid to the NPS also had troub-
ling implications. If Congress passes 
Reagan's proposed legislation on ter-
rorism, some Philippine opposition 
groups in the U.S. might be classified as 
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''terrorist. , , 
To many academicians and activists, 
however, more important than the ac-
tions of one individual were the broad 
questions raised by the issue of scholars 
working for the CIA, whether openly 
or not. Steve Shalom, a political science 
professor who initiated a letter among 
Philippine academicians pledging not 
to consult for the CIA said, "it made 
me realize that people now feel they can 
go back to the world of the 1950s when 
one could mention it with pride." 
Many believe that this trend of the CIA 
offering inducements to academia will 
increase commensurate with U.S. in-
tervention in the Philippines. 
-Erik Guyvt 
Philippines 
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the ''strategic stalemate,,, or rough 
military parity by 1987. The strategic 
stalemate will be marked by NP A oper-
ations in large-sized units and the estab-
lishment of several guerrilla bases -
areas off limits to the Philippine 
military. Current NP A operations have 
included company-sized units of up to 
200 men and over 10 guerilla based 
areas have reportedly been established. 
U.S. officials are unusually frank in 
expressing their concern that the NPA's 
prediction may come true. One assis-
tant secretary of defense warned that if 
the present trends continue "the bal-
ance of power could favor the in-
surgents within the next several years." 
Faced with that prospect, the U.S. is 
looking for ways to insure the survival 
of the Marcos regime. 
The U.S. Moves 
The uncomfortable dilemma that 
U.S. policy makers now find them-
selves in is mainly of their own making. 
For years the U.S. consistently support-
ed Marcos since he was sole guarantor 
of the U.S. bases and U.S. policy was 
predicated on maintenance of those 
bases. Now, however, with Marcos 
perceived as a liability, certain quarters 
would pref er to dispose of the liability. 
Yet, due to his control over the 
military, Marcos has made himself in-
dispensible as the linchpin which holds 
the Philippine military together. 
The Philippine military is plagued 
with poor morale and intense fac-
tionalism. In Manila, so-called 
"overstaying generals" long past 
retirement age, often maneuver for 
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political spoils. Meanwhile, morale is 
low among junior officers and colonels 
relegated to outlying posts where they 
see their careers languishing. The main 
split in the military is between Marcos' 
former bodyguard Gen. Ver and Lt. 
Gen. Fidel Ramos who replaced Ramos 
as acting chief of staff and is seen as 
more of a ''professional.,, In late 
November the rift was dramatized 
when Ver supporters, in a show of mus-
cle against their acting superior Ramos, 
mobilized tanks and troops in Manila 
spawning coup rumors. 
One assistant secretary 
of defense warned that if 
the present trends continue 
''the balance of power could 
favor the insurgents within 
the next several years. '' 
The U.S. seeks to "professionalize" 
the Philippine military through increas-
ed training programs and joint maneu-
vers. Speaking before Congress for a 
doubling in present U.S. training pro-
grams Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian Af-
fairs, summed up U.S. goals: "In this 
period of change and upheaval in the 
Philippines, it is more important than 
ever that we strengthen the existing 
close personal ties with its younger 
military leaders." 
Yet the Pentagon must proceed care-
fully in strengthening these ties without 
exacerbating existing tensions within 
the military. As one Assistant Secretary 
of Defense candidly stated ''we have 
relayed our concerns to the responsible 
officers ... I talked to some of them but 
I do not want to identify them.,, 
In the Pentagon's plans to profes-
sionalize the military, a key actor will 
certainly be the West Point trained 
Ramos. With Ramos in place as -chief 
of staff, Pentagon officials can argue 
that the Philippine military is being 
reformed: Ver, the corrupt general 
associated with Marcos and implicated 
in the assassination, was removed and a 
professional has been installed. While 
Ramos, a veteran of Vietnam and 
Korea, may have a better image, many 
observers point out that Ramos is a 
strong loyalist to his second cousin -
Marcos - and played a key role in in-
stituting Martial Law. Moreover, as 
commander of the Philippine Con-
stabulary, Ramos has line command 
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responsibility over the military unit 
most notorious for human rights 
abuses. 
The next two years will be crucial as 
the strength of the Philippine opposi-
tion movement grows and the U.S. 
escalates it military commitments to 
Marcos. For the vast majority of 
Filipinos, their opposition movement 
holds greater promise after 13 years of 
dictatorship. Yet unless anti-interven-
tionist, human rights and disarmament 
groups organize around the Philip-
pines, the following conversation will 
become all the more common. 
A few months ago, a Filipino human 
rights activist confronted a powerful 
congressional aide with local press ac-
counts about uniformed U.S. military 
advisors participating in a large 
counterinsurgency campaign in his pro-
vince. Instead of denying it, the aid 
justified the presence of "observers" 
claiming "There's too much at stake 
for us to not have a man in the field." 
Erik Guyot is the Co-Director of the 
Congressional Liaison Unit of the 
Philippine Support Committee. For 
more information please write to: 
Philippine Support Committee, 1346 
Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 533, 
Washington, De 20036. 
•one of the best works on militarization 
and Martial Law is "Militarization: 
Philippines" by P.N. Abina/es, Na-
tionalist Resource Center, 1982, 
Manila. 
2Development Debacle: The World 
Bank in the Philippines, Bello, Kinley, 
Elinson, Institute for Food and Devel-
opment Policy, 1982, provides one of 
the most complete case studies of the 
workinf! of the World Bank. 
The Resist Pledge System 
The most important source of Resist's 
income is monthly pledges. Pledges 
help us plan ahead by guaranteeing us 
a minimum monthly income. In turn, 
pledges receive a monthly reminder let-
ter (in addition to the newsletter) which 
contains news of recent grants and 
other Resist activities. So take the 
plunge and become a Resist pledge! 
Yes, I would like to pledge S 
monthly to the work of Resist. 
Name ___________ _ 
Address __________ _ 
City ___ State __ Zip ___ _ 
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The Nerve Center, 2327 Webster St., 
Berkeley, CA 94705 
The Nerve Center, a resource Center 
for disarmament organizers and the 
general public, focuses on chemical and 
biological warfare. Their work has 
developed out of a growing awareness 
of two facts: first, that chemical and 
biological weapons themselves pose a 
direct and increasing threat to the safe-
ty of all people; second, that renewed 
interest in chemical and biological war-
fare may actually make nuclear war 
more likely. When the group was 
formed in 1982 the Reagan administra-
tion was attempting, with its binary 
nerve gas program, to break a long 
moratorium on the production of lethal 
chemical weapons. At the same time, in 
the Pentagon, strategists were rewriting 
U.S. military doctrine, evolving new 
plans which presume the offensive use 
of both chemical and nuclear weapons 
in any possible future war in Europe. 
The immediate purpose of the Center is 
to urge the peace and disarmament 
movement to work actively against 
chemical and biological weapons. In 
order to support that aim, they are in-
itiating two projects. One is a special 
nationwide campaign to inform the 
public about dangers of the binary 
nerve gas program. The other is publi-
cation of a regular quarterly newsletter 
covering a much broader range of 
issues, titled UNMASK. In December 
1983, they wrote and designed a 
brochure on the binary program and 
with assistance from Resist, printed 
3,000. Resist's recent grant went 
towards the next issue of UNMASK. 
Julie Community Center, 2001 E. 
Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21231 
The Julie Community Center is a 
community-based and controlled 
organization in an economically 
deprived area of Baltimore. Since 1977 
this area, which is three-fourths of a 
mile from Center City Baltimore and its 
Inner Harbor, has been undergoing 
reinvestment displacement, i.e., the 
uprooting of low-income residents 
from their homes as property values 
rise and professional, middle-income 
persons are attracted to the neighbor-
hood. The Center's goal is to develop 
strong self-reliant neighborhoods in its 
area by offering the support necessary 
for community groups to come togeth-
er to define their needs and to act to 
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achieve them. The constituency of the 
Center are low-income persons and 
families who lack ownership of and/ or 
access to needed resources to control 
their own lives and to impact the decis-
ions which affect their lives. The special 
foci of the Center are housing, health 
care, and people's rights advocacy. A 
cultural dimension is also fostered 
through art classes, encouragement of 
crafts and celebrative activities. One 
off-shoot of the Center is the Concern-
ed Citizens of Butchers Hill, Inc., a 
low-income group of tenants who were 
threatened with displacement from 
their homes in 1977. As a result of the 
efforts of the Center, they now own 
and manage the 10 houses, 31 units in 
which they live. Another off-shoot, 
Our Neighborhood Effort in Housing, 
now owns seven houses and consists of 
30 families. Presently, the Center con-
tinues to work around issues of 
displacement, housing and empower-
ment. Resist's grant went towards the 
purchase of a Panasonic video tape 
deck that will be used to show locally 
produced videos at block meetings in 
the neighborhood and will be shared by 
other community groups in the area. 
Madre, 853 Broadway, Rm 905, NY, 
NY 10003 
Madre is a friendship association be-
tween women in the U.S. and women in 
Central America and the Caribbean. 
Madre's purpose is to stop U.S. in-
tervention in Central America and the 
Caribbean by developing an exchange 
between people here and there. It has 
established a number of campaigns to 
that end, and has met with an extraor-
dinarily positive response. The pro-
grams include one-to-one correspon-
dence, ''twinning'' of daycare centers, 
and major material aid campaigns. The 
approach provides individuals . and 
organizations with a positive, concrete 
way to become involved, register con-
cern and opposition to U.S. interven-
tion, and actually participate in an ef-
fort which offers real support to those 
most affected by the U.S. policies. As 
part of its ongoing programmatic 
work, MADRE conducts a media cam-
paign and has received attention in a 
number of major publications as well as 
on television news and on radio. 
MADRE has also developed local 
"Friends of MADRE" groups 
throughout the country. In addition, 
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community organizations and local 
chapters of national organizations take 
on the campaigns. Resist's grant went 
towards the cost of a new com-
puter /word processor which will enable 
MADRE to reach more people and 
spend more time out in the field 
developing new projects. 
Other Recent Grants 
Blacks Against Nukes, 
3728 N. Hampshire Ave., NW 202, 
Washington, DC 20010. 
Indigenous People's Network, 
PO Box 384, Rochester, VT 05767. 
Nuclear XChange,4649 Sunnyside Ave. 
Seattle, WA 98103. 
Symphony Tenants Organizing Project, 
58 Burbank St., PO Box 577, 
Boston, MA 02123. 
Child Care Employee Project, 
PO Box 5603, Berkeley, CA 94705. 
CORRECTION: We neglected to note 
that the two remarkable photos in the 
last issue of the newsletter are credited 
to Paul Hutchcroft of the Philippine 
Support Committee. 
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